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Abstract—Cyber peacekeeping is an emerging and multi-
disciplinary field of research, touching upon technical, political
and societal domains of thought. In this article we build upon
previous works by developing the cyber peacekeeping activity
of observation, monitoring and reporting. We take a practical
approach: describing a scenario in which two countries request
UN support in drawing up and overseeing a ceasefire which
includes cyber terms. We explore how a cyber peacekeeping
operation could start up and discuss the challenges it will face.
The article makes a number of proposals, including the use of
a virtual collaborative environment to bring multiple benefits.
We conclude by summarising our findings, and describing where
further work lies.
Index Terms—Cyber Peacekeeping, Cyber Warfare, Cyber
OMR, Cyber Peace Operations
I. INTRODUCTION
THe United Nations conducts peace operations around theworld, aiming to maintain peace and security in conflict
torn areas. Whilst early operations were largely successful,
the changing nature of warfare and conflict has often left the
UN struggling to adapt. In this article, we make a contribution
towards efforts to plan for the next evolution in conflict: cyber
warfare. It is now widely accepted that cyber warfare will
be a component of future conflicts, and much research has
been devoted to its study. Despite the vast amount of research
relating to cyber warfare, there has been relatively little on its
impact towards peace operations.
Previous work on this topic has sought to define the concept
of cyber peacekeeping [1], [2], [3]. The goal of this paper is
to follow up specifically on work by Robinson et al. [3]. We
build upon this work by exploring the practicalities of starting
up a cyber peacekeeping component and conducting the initial
task of observation, monitoring and reporting.
II. METHODOLOGY
In Robinson et al. [3], each United Nations (UN) peacekeep-
ing activity was briefly examined for feasibility and value in
a cyber warfare context. The aim was to cover the breadth of
peacekeeping, and to pick out specific activities which would
be both valuable and feasible to perform. This article builds
upon this work, by taking the activity of cyber observation,
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monitoring and reporting (OMR) and discussing how it could
be carried out at a practical level. To do this, we also describe
the mission start-up process which leads to cyber OMR.
To guide our discussion, we begin by describing a fictional
conflict scenario where cyber warfare has been used and is of
concern to the involved parties. This scenario is described in
sectionIII.
III. SCENARIO
The neighbouring states of Country A and Country B have a
history of conflict, which has traditionally been confined to the
domains of air, land and sea. However, in recent months the
cyber domain has also been used in a warfare capacity. The
cyber warfare aspect of the conflict has included both hard
and soft attacks. By ”hard” we mean attacks such as denial of
service and the planting of malware into sites such as critical
infrastructure (power grid, water supply, transport systems
etc.). This cyber warfare has been particularly damaging to
both sides, interrupting the provision of basic services. Power
outages have been common in both nations, and public trust
in the water supply is damaged after high profile cases of
improper water treatment. ”Soft” attacks have included the
spreading of misinformation to the public via cyber means
and accusations of electoral interference. This combination of
hard and soft cyber attacks, has placed both countries on the
verge of collapse as a lack of basic services combined with
suspicion over the legitimacy of election results has led to civil
unrest.
Both countries seek an end to the situation and express a
wish for a halt to the conflict. They request UN assistance
in drawing up, implementing and verifying compliance with
a ceasefire agreement. UN peacemakers begin work to draw
up traditional terms such as withdrawal of armed forces to a
defined boundary, the holding of negotiations to reach a long
term sustainable peace and a process of disarmament by both
parties. However, both parties have been significantly damaged
by the cyber warfare aspects of the conflict and agree that the
ceasefire agreement should also contain cyber terms to end
it. Both sides look to the UN peacemakers for leadership and
advice in this domain.
A. Cyber Peacemaking
In our scenario, both parties look to the UN for assistance in
drawing up cyber related ceasefire terms and overseeing their
implementation. This will be a new area for the UN, and it is
therefore necessary to briefly discuss cyber peacemaking and
the kinds of terms which may be agreed upon. The process
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2of mediating and drawing up an effective and lasting ceasefire
agreement is a complex and challenging task [4], [5]. A full
discussion of this complexity is beyond the scope of this
article. Instead, we focus upon the possibilities of cyber related
ceasefire terms. This in itself will become a field of research
and practice in the future; what we provide here is only the
foundation.
A clear starting point for thinking about cyber related
ceasefire terms is to propose that both parties cease launching
cyber attacks. This aligns with one of the three core ceasefire
goals: cessation of hostilities [6]. In practice such a term would
be difficult to monitor due to the problem of attribution in
cyberspace [7]. As discussed in Robinson et al. [3] and in
many other works [8], [9], this is the technical challenge of
gathering unequivocal proof that cyber attack X came from
party Y. In short, it is difficult to present proof that would
pass even the minimal of evidentiary standards [9]. This is
not particularly a problem for nations; they are free to attribute
attacks without fear of having to reveal their sources or open
their evidence to independent inspection. This leads to what
has been named faith-based attribution: nonscientific analysis
that leads to untestable attribution [9]. UN peacekeeping
cannot and should not employ such methods. It is an activity
based upon the trust of both parties and transparency. It is
therefore essential that claims of ceasefire violations must be
backed up by open evidence. It has consequently been argued
that peacemakers should simply avoid any cyber terms which
require solid, verifiable attribution [3].
This conclusion limits the types of terms which could be
included in a cyber ceasefire agreement. For the purposes of
our scenario, we can take the examples given by Robinson et
al. [3], and add one more:
1) Both countries to provide full assistance to UN cyber
peacekeepers in dismantling botnets and other sources of
denial of service attacks which are physically located in
their borders.
2) Both countries to cooperate with the UN in the prevention
of cybercrime/spoiler attacks which are originating from
within their borders.
3) Declaration of information stolen during the conflict.
4) Declaration of systems compromised and assistance with
returning control to rightful owners. Caution must be
used here because there may be a dispute about who the
rightful owners of certain systems are.
5) Declaration of known vulnerabilities in critical infrastruc-
ture.
6) Remote disabling of malware (if possible) or assistance
in locating and removing malware.
7) The right for each party to request UN cyber peacekeeper
monitoring of particular sites.
These ceasefire terms avoid the attribution problem because
they all involve person to person cooperation that can be
observed and monitored. Peacekeepers can observe how coop-
erative each party is in helping to dismantle botnets, disable
malware, return control of systems and declare vulnerabilities.
Regardless of the result of such cooperation, clear demonstra-
tions of transparency, honesty and openness in assisting cyber
peacekeepers would be seen as fulfilment of the agreement.
Conversely, inaction, opaqueness or refusal to cooperate can be
indicators of a violation. Measuring the levels of compliance
in this way will be much more productive to peace and a
better use of resources in comparison to engaging into debates
about proof with each party. It must be noted that choosing
to sidestep the challenge of attribution does not mean cyber
peacekeepers will simply ignore the problem of cyber attacks.
As will be discussed, they will be handled in a defensive
manner.
It is noted that these are a simplification of ceasefire terms.
As noted in ceasefire literature [10], [6] there is no room for
ambiguity, and every term such as denial of service, botnet
and cyber-crime must be clearly defined and agreed with both
parties. The terms presented here are therefore just examples,
chosen for the purposes of describing how cyber OMR could
be performed.
IV. MISSION START-UP
With a ceasefire in place, the UN Security Council is in
a position to authorise a UN peacekeeping operation which
contains a cyber component. We therefore explore the practi-
calities of starting up the cyber component of such a mission.
Whilst UN processes are complex, we propose that a cyber
component can fit into existing processes without the need for
any significant changes to the established ways of working.
This is because the processes themselves have been designed
with the aim of unifying multiple disparate entities. We begin
with a discussion on securing the necessary cyber expertise.
A. Finding Cyber Expertise
Our scenario represents a situation the UN may find itself in:
being asked to guide the drawing up of a ceasefire agreement
which meaningfully addresses cyber warfare and overseeing
its implementation. If unprepared, the UN may struggle to
secure the expertise at short notice, leading to delays in
the peace process. This is undesirable as once started, a
peace process must progress quickly to capitalise upon the
honeymoon period [11]. Similarly, securing the wrong types
of expertise may lead to failed implementation and a relapse
into conflict. It is therefore essential to think about how the
UN could secure suitable cyber expertise ahead of time. To
assist with this task, we first describe how the UN secures
expertise presently.
The UN has no standing army or police force, and must
request contributions of troops, police and observers from
UN member states who act as Troop Contributing Countries
(TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) [12]. As
of February 2018, the UN had just over 100,000 contributed
police, military experts and troops from 123 nations [13].
Although the word contribution suggests that they are char-
itably donated, nations contributing troops are reimbursed at
a standard rate, which in 2018 is US$1,332 per soldier per
month [14]. Numerous works exist which explore why states
do or do not choose to contribute personnel [15], [16], [17].
The UN also maintains a pool of civilian staff. As of 2018
the UN had more than 15000 civilians serving in peacekeeping
3operations around the world [18]. These civilians fulfil many
roles not suited to either troops or police, such as providing
general administrative assistance, acting as public information
officers or providing specific expertise such as logistics or ICT
knowledge. Civilians can serve as international staff, national
staff from the host country, as UN volunteers, consultants or
contractors [18].
Clearly the UN already has the systems in place to ac-
quire expertise from multiple sources: it can tap into na-
tional militaries and police forces around the world or from
civilian sources where necessary. When considering cyber
peacekeeping, we propose that cyber expertise could come
from all of these sources. States can be a source of cyber
peacekeepers by contributing military cyber warfare troops and
cyber crime police officers, but expertise can also be found in
non-governmental organisations, private industry, charities and
volunteers. It is therefore possible to define multiple sources
of cyber peacekeepers:
• Cyber Contributing Countries (CCCs) - States which
contribute uniformed cyber peacekeepers from the police
or military.
• Cyber Contributing Organisations (CCOs) - Organisa-
tions which contribute civilian cyber peacekeepers from
their workforce.
• Volunteers - People with cyber expertise who volunteer
their time.
• Full time UN cyber staff - civilians recruited as employ-
ees by the UN.
Aside from these traditional approaches to securing per-
sonnel, there is ongoing debate regarding the use of private
security companies (PSCs) in UN peacekeeping operations.
The use of private security companies in conflict areas is not
new, with companies such as Blackwater providing armed
security in Iraq [19]. To date, the UN has avoided using
PSCs for front line activities, but has contracted companies
such as ArmorGroup for mine action duties with successful
results [20]. With a willingness to use PSCs, their potential as
a reliable source of cyber peacekeepers is clear but caution
must be used since the disadvantages of PSCs are well
documented [20].
An advantage the UN has in searching for cyber expertise
is that cyber peacekeepers will be required in much lower
numbers than troops or police. While a border may require
thousands of troops to guard and patrol it, a network can
be monitored by a handful of cyber peacekeepers, utilising
technology to automate a number of monitoring tasks. This
lower number of required staff will slightly mitigate the many
problems described next.
Although there are many potential sources of cyber peace-
keepers in theory, they will likely be challenging to secure
in practice. The reasons for this are political, societal and
economic in nature. To begin, we briefly discuss the existing
challenges of securing troop and police contributions.
The problems faced by the UN in securing good quality con-
tributions is well documented [21], [22]. Nations with highly
trained troops and police are unwilling to face a shortage
at home by sending them abroad to potentially dangerous
regions [15]. Those nations with inexpensive personnel are
more likely to contribute, but the incentive here is often
economic: the compensation provided by the UN per soldier or
officer is often more than their cost [15]. For example, some of
the most significant contributions have come from nations such
as Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Ghana [15]. The
US, UK, France, China and Russia all have a record of low
personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping missions [15].
Whilst economics plays a part in this discrepancy, it is not the
only factor. The decision on whether to contribute can depend
on many factors such as if it is in their own national interest
(e.g. the instability is on their border and could spillover) and
the level of toleration for casualties (the US withdrawal from
Somalia in 1994 was partially due to a low tolerance for the
loss of US troops) [17].
When looking to the cyber domain, we must navigate these
factors to evaluate how likely contributions of cyber personnel
will be.
From an economic perspective, the indicators are not good.
As the threat of cyber warfare increases, nations are competing
to secure good quality cyber expertise in a market with limited
supply. In 2015 it was reported that the US Cyber Command
only has half the staff required, citing competition with the
private sector as an obstacle towards securing the staff numbers
it needs [23]. With nations and businesses around the world
competing for a limited supply of good quality cyber personnel
and incidences of cyber warfare and crime increasing, cyber
peacekeepers will be an expensive asset.
Looking from a political angle, the willingness to suffer a
cyber skills shortage at home for the benefit of UN peace-
keeping abroad is likely to be limited. Even if a highly cyber
developed nation could technically spare cyber personnel, it
is debatable whether they would allow their staff to work
alongside staff from another cyber competing nation. This
is significant in a political environment where tensions over
cyber warfare currently run high between some of the most
cyber developed nations [24], [25]. Nations may prefer keep
their cyber personnel at home, or to limit sharing with trusted
partners such as NATO or the African Union.
Although there are clear challenges, some aspects may
encourage contributions. For example, proximity to the conflict
area may be a driver of cyber peacekeeper contribution:
critical infrastructure at risk of failing could potentially impact
neighbouring states. In this regard, there is a self interest to
contribute the expertise. Furthermore, it has been noted in the
literature that peacekeepers often stand to benefit profession-
ally from the experience [26]. Peacekeepers also largely report
their duties to be satisfying [27] and studies have shown that
the experience of peacekeeping has a beneficial effect on qual-
ity of life [28]. With this in mind, cyber peacekeeping may be
attractive to civilians who are looking for both job satisfaction
and a level of professional development that otherwise might
not be open to them.
Although the UN will be aiming to secure relatively small
numbers of cyber peacekeepers, the issues described will be a
significant challenge. Nations may be unwilling to contribute
personnel and it remains to be seen how much civilian interest
will emerge. This challenge cannot go ignored, and methods
to encourage contributions and civilian recruitment must be
4built into the design.
B. Fitting cyber into the organisation
While securing cyber talent will be challenging, we assume
that the UN will be able to secure some. With this assumption,
we must next consider how these cyber staff will be organised,
and where they will be placed into the existing organisational
structure. Figure 1 shows a simplified version of the existing
structure:
Fig. 1. Traditional UN Peacekeeping Organisational Structure
At the tactical level there are currently military, civilian
and police components. Each of these units is overseen by
a component head who reports to a leadership team at the
mission headquarters. At the tactical level, an immediate
question becomes apparent: should cyber peacekeepers be
considered as military, police or civilian units?
Based on our discussion in section IV-A, we have already
proposed that cyber peacekeepers will come from multiple
sources: some will be from the military, some from police
forces and some from civilian backgrounds. One approach
would be to simply assign cyber peacekeepers to the unit
which matches their background. For example, a cyber peace-
keeper from a national military would be assigned to a
military unit whilst civilians would be assigned to a civilian
unit. This approach does have its advantages (for example,
a military cyber peacekeeper could potentially be armed and
supported by infantry) but it would also potentially damage
communication and coordination between cyber peacekeepers.
We therefore propose that due to the unique nature of cyber
peacekeepers, a new type of unit is created: cyber units.
Placing cyber peacekeepers into a cyber unit would facilitate
cohesion, regardless of their source. It would also open up
a new role, the head of cyber component, to oversee and
be responsible for the tactical cyber aspects of a particular
operation. Figure 2 shows where a cyber component would fit
into the organisational structure.
Fig. 2. Proposed UN Peacekeeping Organisational Structure (Cyber Units
Added)
Whilst the head of cyber component will report to the
leadership team and head of mission for operational planning
and reporting, it is envisioned that cyber experts will also
be present at the strategic level to guide decision making in
strategic aspects relating to cyber.
C. Mission Planning
The overall planning process for UN peacekeeping op-
erations is complex, consisting of multiple plans and
processes[29], [30]. A simplified overview of the plans that
need to be developed and their hierarchy in relation to each
other is shown in figure 3.
Laying the foundation for other plans, the Security Council
mandate sets out an overall political goal. In our scenario,
this would be to secure peace between the two countries. This
mandate is then used to formulate a country wide plan: for
example, what is required in Country A to fulfil the mandate.
5Fig. 3. UN Peacekeeping Plan Levels
Mission wide plans then define how these political intents
can be reached at the strategic level, giving statements on the
type of activities that will be required. Finally, the component
level plans use the mission wide plans to formulate plans
at the tactical level: specific actions, time lines, expected
outcomes and so on. In the next section, we explore how such
a component plan could look for a cyber unit in Country A.
V. THE CYBER COMPONENT PLAN
In our scenario, the cyber component plan would set out the
high level objective of the cyber component: to support the
Security Council mandate by providing the cyber capability
that is necessary to support the restoration of peace. In
particular, the priority of the cyber peacekeeping unit (CPU)
will be to ensure compliance with the cyber terms in the
ceasefire agreement. This high level objective will then be
broken down into smaller tasks, such as conducting technical
assessment missions on proposed sites, forming links with
local stakeholders and building an observation, monitoring
and reporting capability at sites where the value towards
maintaining peace is high.
A. Technical Assessments
One of the terms in our ceasefire agreement is the right for
each party to request UN cyber monitoring of particular sites.
Country A requests monitoring of:
• The president’s office.
• The power grid.
• The control system for their flood defences.
These requests are initially made to UN peacemakers, but
are passed to the head of cyber component for expert eval-
uation. The head of cyber component considers the requests
and launches technical assessment missions to evaluate which
to grant. Such assessments are not new to UN peacekeeping.
They are already well established in peacekeeping as a means
to evaluate the feasibility and value of carrying out a particular
task before it is agreed to. The UN planning toolkit [31]
provides guidance on how such assessments should be con-
ducted. From a cyber component perspective, these assessment
missions should evaluate:
1) The specific ways in which monitoring this site would
contribute towards peace (e.g. a cyber attack upon the site
could threaten civilian lives or lead to state collapse).
2) The level of local support: do local staff welcome the
cyber peacekeepers and cooperate? Are network diagrams
made available for inspection and are staff forthcoming
with assistance?
3) Capacity to act: can the site be effectively monitored
given the current funding, availability of cyber expertise
and equipment?
In practice this assessment would likely find limited value
in monitoring the president’s office and this request would be
denied; however, for the purposes of describing how to conduct
cyber OMR in its simplest form, it is a useful example. This is
because the president’s office is a traditional ICT environment
characterised by desktop computers, mobile devices, printers,
databases and so on. It is this kind of environment in which
the majority of cyber security literature and understanding
is based. We will therefore assume that the request was
granted and describe how a cyber OMR capability would be
established in an ICT environment such as the president’s
office.
VI. CYBER OMR IN ICT ENVIRONMENTS
From the conclusions made in Robinson et al. [3], combined
with our scenario’s ceasefire terms, it is possible to be concise
about what cyber OMR is trying to achieve in our scenario:
• Detecting actions which violate the ceasefire agreement -
our ceasefire terms were chosen to avoid attribution and
to be monitorable through social interaction.
• Detecting violations of human rights - In our scenario
this is primarily protecting civilians from harm (e.g. the
right to life).
• Detecting changes in network structure and network
traffic - by itself this does not bring direct value, but
supports the other goals by raising situational awareness
at a network.
The first goal does not require any technical discussion:
peacekeepers already observe levels of cooperation and com-
pliance and this happens on an interpersonal level. Where more
discussion is required is in regards to the second and third
goals and the necessity to establish a technical monitoring
capability at agreed sites.
A. Establishing a monitoring capability
Just as military units will look to establish an effective
observational capability through the use of patrols, observation
posts and checkpoints [32], cyber units will look to establish
an effective observational capability through cyber means.
The monitoring of computer networks is a well established
domain of cyber security. We can therefore look to existing
literature and best practice for guidance on how we could
establish this capability in a peacekeeping environment. For
example, we can turn to guidance from authors such as
Bejtlich [33] on how to establish suitable network security
monitoring solutions in a traditional ICT environment.
This will initially involve a planning stage, where cyber
peacekeepers consult with local staff and build a picture of
the network, the information expected to be flowing in and out
and any existing monitoring solutions. In line with established
doctrine, the emphasis in cyber OMR should be to engage local
6stakeholders such as IT staff and support them with the cyber
knowledge, expertise and equipment they may lack, rather than
taking over the site and dictating actions. In our scenario,
the UN is operating with consent of the host nation and all
involved parties. Additionally, technical assessment missions
have already concluded that local staff are willing to assist
and are ready to engage with the process.
If discussions lead to the conclusion that existing sensor
coverage is insufficient, new sensors should be placed into the
network to fill gaps in visibility. These sensors can be network
taps (dedicated devices added onto the line to intercept all
traffic) or span ports at existing network devices (a port which
replicates all data passing through a switch).
Once cyber peacekeepers and local staff are satisfied that
monitoring coverage is sufficient, they can begin to monitor
the network and report upon events which may impact the
security of civilians. The technical methods of interpreting
the captured data is an established field of study, and cyber
peacekeepers will be expected to exercise and share their
expertise of network security monitoring here. Numerous
sources of guidance and best practice exist [34], [35], [36], as
well as various off-the-shelf software tools such as Security
Information and Event Management (SIEM) products and
packet sniffers. Cyber peacekeepers will use their expertise
to determine which tools will be best for the particular
environment they are working in.
The key ingredients to success in this scenario are two-
fold: the ability for cyber peacekeepers to build up rapport
with local staff and for them to gain a familiarity with the
network they are monitoring. Where networks are small, this
is not likely to be a problem. Where a network is larger or
highly geographically dispersed, these two goals will be harder
to reach. When considering systems such as the power grid,
components can include power plants, transmission systems,
distribution substations and more. We must consider ways for
a cyber peacekeeping unit to gain familiarity across such large
sites both technically and socially.
We propose that the concept of areas of responsibility
from existing peacekeeping documentation can be leveraged
for this task. Areas of Responsibility (AoRs) is a term used
by UN infantry battalions to divide a geographical area into
smaller areas for groups of infantry to patrol and observe [32],
[37]. This makes it easier for commanders to assign troops
efficiently and ensures that necessary areas are covered by
the right amount of manpower. It also allows the building
of trust between peacekeepers and local people, due to the
opportunity to build up familiarity over time and develop an
appreciation of local issues. It is proposed that the concept
of AoRs would be suitable for cyber OMR, since it would
allow cyber peacekeepers to focus on one area of the site.
The benefits of using AoRs are summarised as follows:
• Splits the observational workload into manageable sub-
areas.
• Allows a team to build up familiarisation with the
network area they are monitoring (its structure, traffic
patterns etc.)
• Enables a team to build rapport with local staff on that
part of the network.
• Allows cyber peacekeepers with different areas expertise
to focus on specific systems.
Fig. 4. Simple representation of areas of responsibility in cyber OMR
In the case of the power grid, a simplistic view of AoRs
being leveraged is visualised in figure 4. In the figure, we
see that multiple parts of the power grid have been split
into observation areas. Cyber peacekeepers with expertise in
industrial control systems (ICS) can therefore be assigned to
the generation or transmission AoRs, whilst those with more
expertise in traditional ICT environments can be assigned to
the office or control centre. Once assigned, these staff will
then be able to build up familiarity with both the systems they
are monitoring and the local staff.
B. Monitoring of an AoR
With the establishment of AoRs at monitoring sites, cyber
peacekeepers now have a technical capability to perform cyber
OMR. The next step is to consider how cyber peacekeepers use
this capability to produce value for a peacekeeping operation.
It is proposed that there are two approaches towards the
observation and monitoring of an AoR: local and remote.
1) Local: The local approach involves cyber peacekeepers
travelling to the AoR and performing their duties in person.
The advantage to this approach is that cyber peacekeepers
will be able to build up a face to face relationship with local
staff. This facilitates trust between cyber peacekeepers and
local stakeholders, which is regarded as vital to the success
of any peacekeeping operation [37]. Local cyber peacekeepers
can also maintain the sensors as required. The disadvantages
of the local approach are numerous however. Firstly, cyber
7peacekeepers would have to physically travel to the site; find-
ing cyber peacekeepers who wish to relocate may be difficult.
At a personal level, the physical security of the location
may be questionable, and work or family commitments may
prevent it. This may result in reduced civilian recruitment.
At an organisational level, the challenges regarding the global
shortage of cyber personnel discussed in section IV-A may
mean that governments and organisations are reluctant to be
without cyber staff whilst they travel to a foreign country. This
issue has already been encountered by the UN in regards to
securing police contributions [21].
It must be noted that the local method may be the only
option available in certain cases. For example, in cases where
air-gapping theoretically exists, external connections may be
prohibited and/or unavailable. Similarly, the technical assess-
ment missions and deployment of additional sensors if needed
would further necessitate a local approach.
2) Remote: The second approach is the remote method,
which capitalises upon an attribute of cyber warfare: lack of
geographical restriction [38]. Once a technical assessment mis-
sion has been completed locally and a monitoring capability
established, it is envisioned that some monitoring could be
performed remotely. Sensors at the site can report back to a
central server, whereby analysis of the collected data can be
performed from any geographical location.
The advantages here are numerous and significant. From
the perspective of a contributing government or organisation,
cyber experts they contribute are not being completely surren-
dered. Contributors can agree to donate a limited portion of a
cyber expert’s time per day, the majority still being available
to the contributor. This is a significant benefit for the UN
when trying to secure the necessary cyber talent in a highly
competitive global market: if contributors are not losing access
to the cyber expert, they will be more likely to contribute.
From the perspective of the cyber peacekeeper, the concern
of physical security is also removed, and there is no need for
the UN to fund the accommodation and living costs associated
with the local approach.
The remote approach is not without disadvantages. Even if
the cyber peacekeeper is fully vetted and determined to be non-
malicious, there is a risk when allowing cyber peacekeepers
to perform their duties remotely with their own hardware.
For example, there is the potential for their system to be
infected with malware which can lead to breaches of secu-
rity. To mitigate this issue, the UN may opt to send cyber
peacekeepers a hardened, locked down and monitored system
which is used purely for the purposes of cyber peacekeeping.
Similarly, the UN would be relying upon the public internet
and peacekeeper’s own internet providers to conduct cyber
OMR. At critical sites with the possibility of significant harm
to civilians, this risk may be too high. A possible mitigation of
this risk would be to use a dedicated communications network.
Another disadvantage is that by being remote, there is potential
to lose the face to face collaboration and rapport building that
comes with the local approach. To resolve this concern, it is
proposed that a virtual collaborative environment (VCE) could
be used.
C. Virtual Collaborative Environment
Virtual collaborative environments are digital spaces where
remotely located people can come together and interact with
each other and with virtual objects. The benefits of VCEs are
well established [39], [40] and research into new applications
for VCEs in areas such as science, education and business is
ongoing [41], [42].
From a cyber peacekeeping perspective, potential off-the-
shelf options include Vastpark, Protosphere, Second Life,
Opensimulator and Open Wonderland. Market reviews and
research which describe the features and capabilities of these
software options are available [39], [43]. A further option
is for a custom solution to be developed using an engine
such as Unity [44]. It is proposed that any VCE used by
cyber peacekeeping must fulfil the following non-functional
requirements:
1) Scalable - The VCE should be suitable for both small
and large scale cyber peacekeeping activities, and allow
for changes in scale without disruption to the operation.
2) Robust - The VCE must be reliable, accepting a high
number of concurrent users with no failures of availabil-
ity. Considering the nature of cyber peacekeeping, it must
also be secure from cyber attacks such as denial of service
and man in the middle attacks.
3) Secure - Sensitive information will be contained in the
VCE. It must have access control, secure communications
and auditing features.
It must also fulfil the following functional requirements:
1) Resource sharing - Cyber peacekeepers will need to
examine sensor data together and study information from
a variety of sources inside the VCE.
2) VOIP - Allowing cyber peacekeepers to communicate
with each other and local stakeholders in real-time.
3) Reporting - The reporting system should be available
from inside the VCE.
In line with the goal of this paper to provide practical guid-
ance, we developed a proof of concept VCE. OpenSimulator
was chosen for this since assets were readily available online
and the set-up process was straight forward. A basic world
was built using terrain found at the OpenVCE website [45].
Defining the requirements of a cyber peacekeeping VCE
allowed the drawing up of potential layouts. Figure 5 shows
the first design of a cyber peacekeeping VCE. The Type 1
VCE is a simple layout whereby each AoR has a monitoring
area, showing the sensor data and other information in real-
time to cyber peacekeepers. Cyber peacekeepers can log in
to the system from anywhere in the world, gain access to
the sensor data and communicate in real time with other
cyber peacekeepers and stakeholders. The Head of Cyber
Component (HoCC) and his or her team is also present in
the VCE if needed (for example, in times of crisis). This
infrastructure allows all parties to achieve situational aware-
ness, communicate with each other in real time, cross correlate
events and provide assistance or inspect incidents as they
happen. Local stakeholders are invited into the environment
to communicate, contribute and witness how the monitoring is
progressing. This encourages transparency in the operation and
8fosters trust. Liaisons from other unit types such as police and
military can also be present, allowing for timely and unified
coordination of actions across the whole operation. Note that
cyber peacekeepers are not strictly confined to their station,
and may assist and communicate freely with other people as
needed.
Fig. 5. VCE Layout Type 1
There are advantages and disadvantages to the Type 1
layout. On the plus side, it is a simple design which fulfils
the previous criteria. All AoRs are monitored and staff can
communicate and assist each other freely. Arguably the most
significant disadvantage is that it is resource intensive and
fatiguing for staff. Using this design, each AoR is manned 24/7
with cyber peacekeepers being required inside the VCE and
performing real time monitoring. This observation therefore
raised the question of whether the monitoring needs to be
real time or if it can be performed in batches (for example,
reviewed every X hours).
To answer this question, we turn to existing cyber security
literature. Bejtlich [46] states that the decision to use real-time
or batch analysis during network security monitoring primarily
depends upon management’s expectations on timeliness of
reports. This is a reasonable stance, since in a private organi-
sation it is management who balance up the risks versus costs
and reach a conclusion that suits their organisation. Peacekeep-
ing is different; there are multiple stakeholders who each have
their own expectations of what the operation should deliver.
Taking our scenario, Country A might be satisfied with daily
reports containing summaries from the previous 24 hours.
Country B might have different expectations, and expect to be
informed the moment a violation is detected. Local variations
may exist such as the the power grid demanding daily reports
whilst the operator of the flood defences may desire them
every four hours. There are also additional considerations such
as the potential for civilian harm if an attack is not observed
quick enough. In this regard, peacekeepers themselves may
have their own view on how regularly data should be reviewed.
The pros and cons of real time and batch monitoring during
cyber peacekeeping are shown in figure 6.
The major advantage of real-time monitoring is that safety
critical events can be detected quickly. Although OMR is a
passive activity in both kinetic and cyber peacekeeping, it has
Fig. 6. Real-time vs. Batch Monitoring
been repeatedly emphasised that impartiality does not mean
neutrality [47]. UN peacekeepers have a duty to intervene if
they witness and are able to prevent a threat to the security of
civilians [12]. This is a compelling justification for cyber OMR
being real time, particularly on safety critical networks such
as air traffic control, dams, and nuclear facilities. This must be
balanced against the personnel issues raised in section IV-A:
cyber expertise will be expensive to secure, civilians will be
difficult to recruit and contributing nations may be reluctant
to contribute staff if they are required for extensive periods of
time.
Looking at the arguments for and against, it is concluded
that cyber OMR should use both real-time and batch mon-
itoring. Batch monitoring should be the default choice, but
technical assessment missions can recommend real-time if it
is necessary to prevent harm to civilians or the wider peace
process (e.g. potential for state collapse or destabilisation).
Relating this back to our scenario, the technical assessment
mission at the power grid has concluded that whilst the gener-
ation AoRs will require real-time monitoring, the office would
be suitable for batch monitoring every 24 hours. Figure 7
shows how this could be organised in the VCE.
Here cyber peacekeepers are providing real-time coverage
to AoR-1, along with others who log in every 24 hours and
perform batch monitoring in pairs for a period of two hours.
This pairing of staff allows them to discuss alerts and events
between themselves before raising a report up the command
chain. It is less resource intensive, with the cyber peacekeepers
and local staff only being required for the time it takes to work
through the events from the previous 24 hours.
The significant benefit of this approach is the minimisation
of the time required from cyber peacekeepers. By using batch
monitoring where possible the UN is not only seeking to
minimise the number of cyber peacekeepers required, but also
the amount of time they are required for. The time commitment
of two hours per day is only an example, and in reality
will vary depending upon the complexity of the AoR. The
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attraction of this limited time period is that public and private
organisations can contribute cyber staff with only a minor
impact to their own operations. While this would not guarantee
contributions, it would arguably make them more likely.
A proof of concept Cyber OMR VCE was created using
OpenSimulator, following the design given in figure 7. Fig-
ure 8 shows the result. The environment is split into six areas,
each one being an area for an AoR team.
Fig. 8. PoC VCE Layout
The VCE allows cyber peacekeepers and local stakeholders
to log in and be represented as an avatar. They are able to
communicate with each other via voice and text and to bring
up data on the three displays for interaction and discussion.
In our example, these screens link to the AoR sensors and
display sensor data. An example of this is shown in figure 9.
In practice, these displays can be used for sharing any kind of
data to aid in discussion and analysis. In effect, it is a virtual
security operations centre (SOC) but one that can be quickly
deployed and used by multiple remote analysts.
Fig. 9. PoC VCE Resource Sharing
Whilst we have proposed that a VCE is used to mitigate the
challenge of securing cyber staff contributions, we have noted
that it brings other benefits. These benefits are summarised as
follows:
1) Encourages cyber staff contributions - Nations will be
more likely to contribute cyber expertise if that expertise
will not be lost at home. Contributions of time can be a
fixed amount of hours per day.
2) Transparency - Cyber peacekeepers can be open in their
activities by inviting local stakeholders into the environ-
ment to witness their work.
3) Mission cohesion - The VCE brings all cyber peacekeep-
ers in a region together, allowing cross correlation of
events and sharing of expertise. Non cyber units can also
be present, to aid mission wide cohesion, communication
and unity of effort.
4) Agility and Cost - The VCE can be brought online with
minimal cost. There is no need to house or feed remote
cyber peacekeepers.
5) Safety - Remote cyber peacekeepers in the VCE cannot
be physically harmed.
6) Training - New cyber peacekeepers can be vetted and
trained inside the environment.
Considering all of these advantages, it is concluded that the
VCE will bring benefits beyond just OMR. It will therefore
become a central tool for conducting multiple aspects of future
peace operations.
D. Secure Communications
In the case of remote cyber OMR, the sensors will be lo-
cated locally in the conflict area whilst those analysing the data
will be located remotely. A secure means of transferring the
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data collected by sensors to the central server and subsequently
into the VCE is therefore required. Similarly, in the case of
the local approach, locally based cyber peacekeepers will need
a secure channel to transmit their reports.
Due to the nature of cyber warfare, we cannot automatically
assume that the technology and infrastructure we rely upon
to perform this task will be secure. Hardware, software and
public communications networks could potentially be compro-
mised [48]. In cases of ongoing cyber attacks, networks could
be flooded with traffic and routing systems compromised [49].
It is therefore proposed that a cyber peacekeeping unit will
require a robust set of technologies to mitigate these issues.
To begin, a dedicated and mobile communications link
which is difficult for third parties in a region to tamper with
will be required. A potential solution here would be the use
of satellite services. For example, the Broadband Global Area
Network (BGAN) offered by Immmarsat [50] can provide
cyber peacekeepers with speeds of up to 492kbps. Coverage is
close to global and the terminals are approximately laptop size
and weight. This solution would create a reasonably secure
communications path for cyber peacekeepers to operate inside
a region and perform their duties, regardless of the condition
of local networks. Research into the security and privacy of
mobile networks is an ongoing area of study and developments
here can also bring solutions [51]. We must also consider the
hardware used by cyber peacekeepers; components such as
CPUs and motherboards also have the potential to be com-
promised along the supply chain [48]. This is a much harder
threat to mitigate, and is a common problem. For example, in
2010 Dell Power Edge 410 servers were shipped with malware
pre-installed on the motherboards [52]. Establishing a secure
supply chain will consequently be a challenge faced by a cyber
peacekeeping unit.
E. Proof of concept tools
We have purposely avoided listing specific tools that cyber
peacekeepers should use to perform OMR and there are two
primary reasons for this. Firstly, cyber security tools are always
evolving, and any list provided here would be quickly out
of date by the time cyber peacekeeping is needed. Secondly,
cyber peacekeepers are being employed for their expert knowl-
edge, and should be allowed to select the tools and monitoring
methods that suit their specific site. However, for the purposes
of exploring the practicalities of cyber peacekeeping OMR, we
briefly experimented with potential tools that could fulfil the
cyber OMR goals of our scenario.
To recap, the value we aim to bring is in detecting actual
or impending threats to civilian security. In the case of the
power plant, this could be through a power cut, power surge
or a violent event such as an explosion by tampering with the
logic that runs the plant. Achieving this goal will be supported
by monitoring for changes in network structure and traffic (i.e.
raising situational awareness in an AoR).
In our proof of concept environment, we already have
sensors collecting data and a VCE to view and analyse the
results. We considered ways to monitor the network structure,
and found that commonly available tools such as Alienvault
OSSIM had functionality to monitor the availability of hosts.
When a particular host was taken down, alerts could be raised
and viewed in the VCE. Important structural devices such
as routers and firewalls could be configured to send their
logs to the SIEM and custom rules developed to monitor for
changes. Hence, any changes to the network structure could be
highlighted in the VCE, allowing analysis of the change. Other
tools such as the Passive Real-time Asset Detection System
(PRADS) can also be used to monitor for new devices or
changes in known asset behaviour [35].
Similarly for changes in network traffic, we were able to
configure NetFlow [53] on the sensors. This allowed analysis
of the network traffic volume over time. An example of a
simulated change in network traffic is shown in figure 10.
Fig. 10. Detecting a change in network traffic volume
While it is beyond the scope of this article to compare and
test specific monitoring tools, we have shown that there are
many practical tools to perform the technical aspects of cyber
OMR in an ICT environment if it was required today. Where
more of a challenge will be found is in operational technology
(OT) environments such as critical national infrastructure.
VII. CYBER OMR AT CRITICAL NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
The methods and techniques described thus far will be ef-
fective in a traditional ICT environment such as the president’s
office scenario. Where monitoring becomes more challenging
is in OT environments such as critical national infrastructure
(CNI). Power grids, public water supplies and transport net-
works will be commonly requested sites for cyber OMR. This
is because attacks upon these systems present a significant
threat towards life and to the ongoing stability of a nation.
In this section, we therefore describe the characteristics of
CNI from a monitoring perspective, the challenges that will
be faced and ways to tackle those challenges.
A. CNI Background
The UK government defines national infrastructure as the
”facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks and
processes, necessary for a country to function and upon which
daily life depends. It also includes some functions, sites
and organisations which are not critical to the maintenance
of essential services, but which need protection due to the
potential danger to the public (civil nuclear and chemical
sites for example).” [54]. Figure 11 shows which sectors are
identified by the UK as national infrastructure:
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Fig. 11. Areas the UK regards as National Infrastructure
Critical National Infrastructure is defined as: ”Those critical
elements of national infrastructure (facilities, systems, sites,
property, information, people, networks and processes), the
loss or compromise of which would result in major detrimental
impact on the availability, delivery or integrity of essential
services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or
to loss of life.” [54]. This definition supports our assertion that
CNI will be a popularly requested site for cyber peacekeeping,
since failure directly impacts peace and security.
Research into the cyber security of CNI and the challenges it
presents is extensive [55], [56], [57], [58]. Piggin [59] provides
a concise overview of the potential impacts and attack vectors,
but it is prudent to give a brief history and overview of the
main challenges, to enable discussion on how to conduct cyber
OMR at such sites.
National infrastructure of the past was generally isolated
from the outside world, operating as standalone entities with
no external connections [55]. In this isolated environment, the
threat of an external actor performing some kind of malicious
act was small. Hence, the availability of the systems was
the top priority, with confidentiality and integrity being less
important. The protocols used between devices at such sites
(Modbus, DNP3 etc.) reflected this: encryption was rare and
communications were not tamper resistant [60].
With the arrival of affordable computing and networking,
owners of these facilities saw benefits in connecting them
together. Rather than employ staff to monitor a single facil-
ity, geographically distributed plants could be monitored and
operated from a central location using Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [55]. This provided
a greater level of control with improved efficiency. Today,
national infrastructure capitalises on many modern technolo-
gies including mobile networks, wireless communications,
the internet and embedded devices [60], [61]. Whilst the
technology used at CNI can be referred to by a number of
terms, we adopt the umbrella term of operational technology
(OT).
Whilst the OT used in CNI has enjoyed improved connec-
tivity and efficiency, it has effectively been wrapped around
legacy protocols and devices that have remained unchanged
from the days of isolation. This has created the perfect storm
of introducing multiple vectors of attack into systems which
generally have poor security features.
B. Challenges of cyber OMR at CNI
We have argued that CNI will be a significant part of cyber
OMR for two reasons. Firstly a failure of CNI has the potential
to seriously damage peace and security in a region through
harmful impacts [59]. Secondly, it is particularly vulnerable
to cyber attack due to increased interconnectedness and weak
security at core components. We must therefore explore how
cyber OMR could effectively monitor such sites. From the
perspective of conducting OMR, we propose that cyber peace-
keepers will face the following CNI specific challenges:
1) Fragility - older OT hardware can be fragile [62]. Soft-
ware used to program ladder logic can be basic with
poor error handling. A network port receiving unexpected
data can cause a hardware reset, in some cases causing a
loss of the device’s current logic. Research has shown
that tasks such as asset discovery can only safely be
performed via passive methods [63].
2) Bespoke attacks - Sensors on traditional ICT networks
use signature based detection to identify known attacks.
While this technique will detect some attacks against OT
systems (particularly machines running common software
such as Microsoft Windows or Java), it will not help in
cases where there is a targeted attack against specific OT
hardware. Stuxnet was a bespoke cyber weapon crafted
specifically for attacking Iranian nuclear facilities [64],
for which no signature existed.
3) Time critical operation - Some OT systems are time
critical in their operation. A certain action must occur at
a certain time, with any delay having knock on effects to
later processes. Delays of milliseconds before a message
is delivered has the potential to cause problems.
4) Downtime unacceptable - In ICT environments downtime
for maintenance is acceptable. It can occur at times
where it will cause the least inconvenience. In an OT
environment, this is not true. The power grid cannot
simply be taken down for five minutes, it is an essential
service that is required 24/7.
5) Proprietary protocols - Observing TCP/IP networks is
well understood: the structure of messages is known and
documentation is freely available. Protocols used by older
OT devices are often proprietary, for which limited or
no documentation is made available by the manufacturer.
Some of these protocols are no longer supported but are
still used, due to the hardware remaining in service for
decades. This can not only lead to no support from the
vendor, but also a declining pool of expertise as staff who
are familiar with the protocol retire or change jobs.
6) Airgapping - In the past, manufacturers of OT equipment
recommended that their hardware should be airgapped:
having no physical connection to the outside world. While
a good idea in theory, airgapping is now considered
impractical [65]. However, CNI owners may still abide
by this concept and refuse any outside connections to the
site.
To explore the feasibility of performing cyber OMR at CNI,
we conducted practical exercises to determine what is possible
with existing tools.
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C. Exploring the practicalities
Performing research upon OT systems is challenging. As
discussed, they are often fragile and have a zero-downtime
requirement. CNI owners are understandably reluctant to allow
researchers access to conduct experiments at critical sites.
A common solution is to use simulations: using software to
represent the hardware, software and protocols that would be
in use at a real site. Simulations of OT systems have been
developed by other researchers [66], [67], but are limited in
their ability to reflect all of the properties of an operational
deployment [68]. An alternative approach is to develop a
test bed using the actual hardware and software found in
critical national infrastructure. This approach brings benefits:
a simulation can represent what hardware is supposed to do,
actual hardware shows both documented and undocumented
behaviour. The primary disadvantage in this approach is cost.
The OT test bed based at Airbus in Newport (Wales) is such
a solution, and was made available to assist in our research. As
part of Airbus’ wider research into OT security, the testbed is
used to explore new ways of protecting the core devices which
run CNI and the team have a number of OT specific attacks
to test novel defences. This made it a good choice for also
testing how cyber peacekeepers could practically monitor for
such attacks. Linking back to our scenario, the testbed’s smart
city was used to represent Country A’s power grid. This is a
model of a city, where the power supply is controlled by Allen
Bradley controllers and the Ignition HMI software. The city
is shown in figure 12.
Fig. 12. Airbus OT test bed city
To test traditional tools, an ICT based sensor was built
(based upon Alienvault OSSIM) and added to the test bed. A
free port was located on the network, and a mirror configured
to forward traffic. While this was easy to accomplish in a
test bed environment, it will be more complex in a live
environment. Site operators may be suspicious of adding new
devices to what may be a fragile system that has remained
unchanged for years. Finding a physical connection into the
network may be challenging, and connecting the sensor into
a position where it can see traffic without interrupting or
delaying communication will be an issue.
Once the sensor was in place, an attack was launched against
the control system resulting in a loss of power to the city. The
sensor did not raise any alerts during this attack. This was the
expected result, since modules were designed to detect threats
in ICT, not OT, environments. Other researchers have found
similar results [69].
Commercial security product vendors have noticed this gap
in the market, and a number of products are starting to enter
the market for OT monitoring. For example, Check Point Soft-
ware Technologies[70], Alienvault [71] and Claroty [72] ad-
vertise specialised OT security monitoring tools. Researchers
have recently developed distributed intrusion detection system
(DIDS) for SCADA systems [73]. Airbus itself has also
developed a number of prototype solutions to address specific
OT security issues, such as safe asset discovery and forensic
investigation tools.
Looking wider, further possibilities include model-based de-
tection [74]. Here the behaviour of an OT system is passively
monitored for abnormalities in its operation. Researchers such
as Nicholson, Janicke and Cau [75] have explored this, by
examining the value of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as a
method for observing the state of OT hardware and software
systems at various points in time. They launched two attacks
against a controller, and noted that ITL was successful in
spotting that the state of the controller had changed. XSense
from CyberX claims to leverage this approach using machine
learning, modelling abilities and a patented state machine
design [76]. The product requires a learning period, where
normal operation is witnessed and recorded by the tool. In a
cyber OMR context this ”model based” approach may have
limited utility; the ability to provide a period of learning in a
”safe” state may be lacking if the site is already compromised
before cyber peacekeepers arrive.
Any attempt to define specific tools or methods to conduct
cyber OMR at CNI would be flawed: effective monitoring
will depend upon the configuration of hardware, protocols
and software at a specific site. Furthermore the quality and
quantity of OT monitoring tools is advancing rapidly in this
area and any recommendations would quickly become out
of date. We therefore propose that cyber OMR at CNI will
require a bespoke monitoring solution, where the expertise
and knowledge of cyber peacekeepers is applied along with
OT vendor collaboration. As an example, there are specific
methods for monitoring power distribution sites such as the
deployment of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to measure
the actual voltage and other variables in real time [77], [78].
Such a solution was a major recommendation following the
2003 blackout in the northeastern United States [79] and will
require specialist knowledge to implement.
VIII. REPORTING
Previous sections have described how to perform cyber ob-
servation and monitoring. The aim of this section is to explore
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the practicalities of the final aspect: reporting. Reporting is just
as important as the monitoring and observation that comes
before it. We can gather all kinds of valuable observations,
but that value is lost if they are not communicated properly
and used in decision making.
UN peacekeeping doctrine states that reports should be
”timely, accurate, clear and concise, substantiated with eval-
uations and assessments, to support higher commanders’
decision-making” [37]. UN standard operating procedures for
reporting are well documented [80], and as with all aspects
of cyber peacekeeping, we aim to fit cyber into this existing
process. In a UN peacekeeping operation reports flow up from
the tactical level up to the strategic level, with various points in
between for filtering and collation of data. Using our modified
organisational structure from section IV-B, figure 13 shows
how cyber fits into this existing system.
Fig. 13. UN Operational Reporting System with Cyber added
Peacekeepers in a cyber unit will submit reports to the Joint
Operations Centre (JOC), which already collates and cross-
references information coming in from all units. This allows
the JOC to formulate a daily report, providing the component
heads and leadership team with a coherent overview of the
day’s events at the tactical level.
In general, there are two types of reports that cyber peace-
keepers performing OMR will need to submit: Daily SITREPS
and Special Incident Reports. Cyber peacekeepers will be
observing their AoR in order to detect and observe for a variety
of events. Some of these events will be non-critical, such as
a decline in cooperation from local staff or a non-malicious
and non-critical repeat failure of a particular device at CNI.
These events can be reported in the daily SITREP. This is
a situation report which is submitted to the JOC on a daily
basis, regardless of whether the peacekeeper considers there to
have been any reportable events. The process of creating and
forwarding daily SITREPS is well established in peacekeeping
training material [80] and do not require any alterations for
cyber. At the end of the day, cyber analysts based at the JOC
meet with their team and convey their summary of cyber events
for inclusion into the overall daily situation report sent to the
operational level. Cyber peacekeepers are also observing for
events which could lead to a threat to peace (e.g. to civilian
life). In such cases it will be necessary for the event to be
reported quickly. Here a special incident report (SINCREP)
will be necessary, which is immediately submitted to the JOC
for attention.
A. SINCREP Example
To provide a concrete example of our proposed system, we
return to our scenario. Let us assume that the power plant
AoR team detects unusual network activity on the power
plant’s control network. Abnormal messages are being sent
to logic controllers, but peacekeepers at this stage are not
sure what the effect will be. They generate a SINCREP which
communicates their observations. They include the time the
unusual activity first started, that it is ongoing, the IP addresses
and hardware involved, a description of what is happening and
the network capture files as evidence. This report is sent to
the JOC and received by cyber staff. They analyse the report
and view the evidence, entering into the virtual environment
to communicate with the reporting peacekeepers in real-time.
Because the JOC is collecting reports from all components,
the cyber staff notice that a SINCREP is received from a
police unit that power was briefly lost in a certain region.
Putting these reports together to form a picture of the whole
situation, the JOC is able to provide advance warning to
other components that blackouts might be imminent around
the region. The JOC then acts as a crisis centre to monitor
the situation, inform relevant stakeholders, whilst the cyber
peacekeepers continue to monitor the event and provide advice
to local staff on defensive measures to take.
This scenario brings to the fore a significant question:
should peacekeepers performing cyber OMR stand by and
simply monitor and report whilst a situation degrades and
threatens civilians, or should they actively intervene? This is
not a new question faced by peacekeeping, and has undergone
much discussion and debate [81], [82], [83]. Many past
criticisms of UN peacekeeping have touched upon either the
inability or unwillingness of peacekeepers to use force to
protect civilians around them. UN Resolution 1265 (1999)
emphasised the importance of protecting civilians during peace
operations. Many missions have subsequently been established
with a specific mandate to protect civilians from harm, using
robust measures and loosening up use of force controls. This
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has led to the UN moving away from traditional doctrine, the
Brahimi report and core principles in favour of more robustly
protecting civilians [84], [85].
With this shift of focus in mind, we will not attempt to
state that a cyber peacekeeper performing OMR at a critical
site should passively observe as a threat to civilian security
materialises. Such an act would arguably be a repeat of past
failures such as Bosnia [86] or Rwanda [87]. It is therefore
accepted that when faced with an event where there is potential
for harm to civilians, cyber peacekeepers should take any
reasonable steps to prevent that harm if they are able to.
The impacts of this decision will be further considered in the
evaluation.
B. Integration with the VCE
Since we have proposed that a virtual environment will be
central to cyber peacekeeping, it is prudent to explore the
possibility of integrating the reporting system into it. The goal
is to have as many tools as possible to perform cyber OMR
in one unified location.
As a proof of concept, we used the RequestTracker [88]
ticket system. This software allows immediate transmission
and handling of reports, fulfilling the requirement that reports
are timely. Custom fields were added to the ticket interface,
with the aim of ensuring that tickets fulfilled the requirement
for reports to be concise. The following fields were added:
• Start time of event.
• Type of event.
• Supporting evidence.
• AoR the event was detected in.
• The sensor which detected the event.
Some further modifications were made, with the end result
being a proof of concept cyber OMR reporting system. The
next goal was to examine how the ticket is managed post-
creation. To define a set of rules regarding ticket states for
cyber OMR, it was first necessary to develop the life cycle of
a cyber peacekeeping OMR ticket. The proposed life cycle is
presented visually in figure 14.
It was found that the ticket system integrated well into
the VCE. Reports could be written inside the environment,
allowing multiple actors to contribute to the content. An
example is shown in figure 15.
IX. EVALUATION OF CYBER OMR AGAINST UN
PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES
In this paper, we have explored practical ways in which
cyber OMR could be performed. We now evaluate our propos-
als against the core UN peacekeeping principles of consent,
impartiality and non-use of force except in self defence or
defence of the mandate.
A. Consent
UN peacekeeping doctrine [12] states that consent of the
parties is one of the core UN principles. It is thus necessary
to ensure that cyber OMR as we have designed it does not
have the potential to violate this principle.
Fig. 14. Proposed Cyber OMR Ticket Lifecycle
In our idealistic scenario, the presence of consent is clear.
Both parties have requested UN assistance in overseeing
the cyber warfare aspect of the peace agreement, and both
sides have invited the UN to monitor certain critical sites.
Consent in this case is not only respected, but we would
argue fundamentally required. Attempting to install sensors,
gain familiarity with sites and keep the system running is
only possible by working closely with local staff. If local staff
are not cooperative or work against cyber peacekeepers, cyber
peacekeeping OMR will be extremely challenging to perform
effectively. Consent is the reason why some observational
goals were deemed to be low feasibility. For example, monitor-
ing for violations of privacy. If a host nation is snooping upon
its citizens in the cyber domain, they are unlikely to consent to
cyber peacekeeping if it was believed that cyber peacekeepers
were looking to criticise privacy violations. Therefore, the
principle of consent leads to such activities not being included
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Fig. 15. Interacting with RT from within the VCE
at this stage. It is not worth blocking the value that cyber OMR
can bring in regards to protecting civilian lives, for the sake
of attempting to also protect their privacy.
It is foreseeable that there will be cases where the principle
of consent can become threatened. For example, peacekeepers
performing cyber OMR at sites such as nuclear plants or dams
could face a situation where a significant threat to civilian life
has been detected but local staff refuse and resist corrective
action to prevent it. This will be a problem, since it is made
clear in UN peacekeeping doctrine that peacekeepers must
not stand by and remain passive in the face of clear threats
to civilians [89]. We have already proposed that a cyber
peacekeeper should not stand by and passively observe while
an event escalates to a level where civilian life is threatened.
In such cases, there is strong justification for intervention
without consent: effectively a step into peace enforcement.
How this could be done remains an open question, and it
could have significant negative effects such as a withdrawal
of consent for the whole peace operation. Planning could
minimise the likelihood of this risk. For example, parties
requesting cyber OMR must agree at the outset that threats
to civilian life must be acted upon by local staff, and that
interventions may take place if cooperation at these times is
lacking. By making parties aware of this, the effects of these
interventions can be minimised to not endanger the whole
peace process. Drills of a crisis situation could be valuable, to
gauge how local staff react and highlight any potential issues
before they arise.
A further complication to consent is the area of public
versus private ownership. While kinetic OMR primarily takes
place in the public domain (observing roads, bridges, towns
etc.), cyber OMR has the potential to be taking place in
privately owned networks. For example, a nuclear power plant
may be owned by a foreign energy company. This means that
whilst kinetic OMR can function purely with the consent of
a national government (the owners of these public spaces),
cyber OMR will potentially require the consent of both public
and private entities. This is an interesting area to consider and
must form a suggestion for future work.
Finally, whilst our scenario represents an ideal scenario from
the perspective of gaining consent, the reality of peacekeeping
is often less clear. As noted by de Coning [84] peace oper-
ations today have been noted for their lack of clear consent,
with the Security Council issuing a mandate against a specific
party to the conflict. If our scenario changed so that Country
B did not provide consent, the task of performing cyber OMR
in that country would become much more challenging.
B. Impartiality
The principle of impartiality is important to UN peacekeep-
ing, ensuring that peacekeepers can act as a trusted party. In
our scenario, impartiality is respected. Both sides are offered
cyber OMR, and peacekeepers are not attempting to attribute
cyber attacks to a particular side.
Cyber OMR must be offered to all parties of a conflict
equally. If it appears that the UN is providing cyber OMR
for a number of sites in Country A and that Country B is not
offered the same opportunity, there is potential for the principle
of impartiality to be violated. It should therefore be made clear
to parties at the outset that cyber OMR is available to all, but
that only a limited number of sites will be monitored based
upon the potential threat to civilian security.
A threat to impartiality is found in resource contention.
One party may request cyber OMR at twenty sites, consuming
the majority of UN cyber peacekeeping resources. If another
party makes a similar request a month later, the UN may find
itself unable to fulfil the request and impartiality will again be
violated. Peacekeepers must be conservative when agreeing to
monitoring, and only agree to sites where failure could lead
to civilians being harmed or another threat to peace, such as
state collapse. The focus of cyber OMR must clearly be one
of these goals, not to provide ”free” security monitoring so
that a party can divert their own cyber resources elsewhere.
Cyber OMR teams must also make efforts to be transparent
in the tasks they perform, to avoid claims that cyber peace-
keepers are helping one party more than the other. Considering
our proposal that cyber peacekeepers must intervene if they
can prevent a threat to civilians, this will be challenging. Our
virtual collaborative environment presents opportunities here,
with the potential for stakeholders from both sides to have a
presence in the environment and witness the tasks that cyber
peacekeepers perform. This would enhance transparency, and
help to minimise claims of partiality.
C. Non use of force
Our design of cyber OMR does not utilise force. Attacks
against an AoR are observed and reported through the report-
ing system. Cyber peacekeepers are not attempting to take
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offensive actions such as launching counter cyber attacks.
Although OMR is primarily passive, it was noted that peace-
keepers are required to intervene if a grave violation of human
rights is observed. This equates to a situation such as a cyber
attack which is close to opening a dam or making the public
water supply toxic. In such scenarios, cyber peacekeepers must
intervene if possible to prevent the harm. This intervention will
likely be through notifying the network owner, advising them
on what must be done and assisting with implementing the
action. Such an action would not be a use of force. In cases
where the response from the network owner is lacking, local
cyber peacekeepers may have to take enforcement action. If the
local staff actively resist, there is a situation where force could
be the next step. This would require cyber units to be supported
by police or military units to provide physical security whilst
the action is taken. In such a scenario, the use of force would
be in defence of the mandate. It would therefore not violate
the principle.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have explored the practicalities of starting
up and performing just one cyber peacekeeping activity: cyber
OMR. Basing our work on the foundations set in previous
work [3] we have reached a number of conclusions, sum-
marised below:
• Cyber terms in peace agreements should be chosen
carefully. We want to avoid terms which require solid
attribution in cyberspace, and favour those which can be
measured at a human interaction level while still bringing
value.
• Securing the required cyber expertise will likely be the
biggest obstacle towards cyber peacekeeping.
• Cyber fits easily into existing structures and processes.
• Cyber OMR will bring most value at CNI, with a focus
on protection of civilians and state stability.
• Technical obstacles towards monitoring CNI are being
broken down as new products and tools come to market,
but there is still a skills shortage in this area, which will
place further pressure on securing capable staff.
• Use of a virtual collaborative environment brings a num-
ber of benefits including transparency, ease of collabora-
tion, information sharing and the potential for states to
contribute their cyber experts without losing capability at
home.
• Our proposals do not violate established UN peacekeep-
ing principles.
The discussions held in this paper raise deeper questions
about cyber OMR as an activity. Firstly, UN peacekeeping as
a whole is currently undergoing a shift in how it operates.
The doctrine we have based our scenario on is the 2008
capstone [12]. This is the current ’official’ way in which UN
peacekeeping should work, based upon the findings of the
Brahami report [89]. However, many authors point out that
UN peace operations of today do not follow this doctrine [84],
[90]. For example, in the DRC consent from all parties is
not present, with some openly hostile to peacekeeping forces.
Neither is impartiality, with the UN effectively supporting
a government against insurgency. Non use of force is also
questionable, with the UN actively partaking in offensive
operations in collaboration with government forces [84]. It
would therefore be useful to present a scenario which does not
fit the 2008 doctrine and explore the impact upon the value
and feasibility of cyber OMR.
We proposed that a peacekeeper performing cyber OMR
must intervene to prevent harm if they are able to do so. This
raises a question about the role of cyber OMR as a passive
activity. If cyber peacekeepers are commonly stepping in to
take action, it is arguably more efficient to establish a cyber
buffer zone from the outset. In this regard, it is possible to
propose that cyber OMR should not be a standalone activity,
but rather a component of a cyber buffer zone. This will be
explored in future work regarding cyber buffer zones.
An area of future work is to look at feasible ways of
solving the challenge of securing cyber expertise. If the major
obstacle towards effective cyber OMR will be the limited
supply of cyber expertise and political concerns from highly
developed nations (as discussed in section IV-A), it would be
prudent to explore non-UN means of protecting civilians and
state stability both during and following cyber warfare. For
example, alliances such as NATO or the Arab League where
the member states share common military goals and would be
more willing to share cyber expertise.
It would also be valuable to explore how existing frame-
works could be leveraged to bolster cyber OMR. For example,
the NIS Directive in Europe demands that member states have
in place a framework and national cyber security authority
(NCSA) so that they are equipped to manage cyber security
incidents [91], [92]. These NCSAs would likely be major
enablers and contributors to cyber peacekeeping, allowing
peacekeepers to quickly enter sites and gain familiarity. Opera-
tors of essential services also have to take appropriate security
measures and are required to report cyber security incidents.
In this regard, it could be argued that frameworks such as the
NIS Directive already go some way to motivating owners of
critical infrastructure to develop a monitoring capability. From
a cyber peacekeeping perspective, efforts such as NIS could
reduce the initial workload to establish a monitoring capability
in a nation.
Finally, this article has only sought to develop the peace-
keeping activity of cyber OMR. As described in Robinson et
al. [3], there are many more valuble and feasible activities
which need further development. Developing activities such
as DDR, SSR, malware action and the practicalities of cyber
ceasefire agreements remains an open area of work. Input from
experts in these areas is essential, since cyber peacekeeping
is fundamentally a cross disciplinary challenge. Furthermore,
other forms of peace operations such as conflict prevention
and peace enforcement also remain open. Conflict prevention
in particular has been regarded as critical towards the future
of peace operations [93]. It would therefore be valuable to
explore efforts such as the confidence building measures put
forward by the OSCE [94] and other groups.
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